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Thu Nov 23, 2006 at 17:07:57 PM EST
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This Diary is for sharing news and ideas pertinent to these countries. |
| AnnieB :: Australia and New Zealand for November |
| This is the text from the old site:
14 November 2006
RobT – at 19:46
I thought this was noteworthy enough to start the November thread.
I just spoke to a senior medico in the Australian Federal Dept of Health regarding my concerns on several issues, and I thought his responses were important enough to share.
- CFR. I expressed the concern that the plans as published do not reflect the current CFR and are in fact based upon 1968 CFR values which are two orders of magnitude below current H5N1 CFR ie 0.6% for 1968 and over 60% for current H5N1. He agreed completely. He agreed there is no immutable rule that says the virulence has to drop, and so it may not. But other Influenza A virus have shown attenuation during the period of epidemic/pandemic so there is an assumption that H5N1 may do the same. He made the point that from an epidemiological point of view, regardless of the severity of the pandemic, the things we need to do to moderate the impact are very much the same. We discussed the evolution forces to cause the virus to attenuate, and I made the point that chickens are not feeling more secure and expecting the virulence to drop, they are dying at a 100% rate as they have from the beginning. The parallel to densely populated cities and countries was then discussed, and the implications are obvious. Big severe impact.
- Risk communication. I expressed my concern that given the probable severe impact, ie high CFR, why the Australian authorities were not communicating the real risks to the public. It was a long conversation, but the short version is that they are well aware of the issue, that they believe the timing is important, and that they believe there will be enough time from when the pandemic breaks out to inform the public of what needs to be done re quarantine issues, stockpiling non-perishable foods and water etc. My viewpoint was the earlier the better to allow for the adjustment reaction and enough time for families to prepare. He said there was alot of negative feedback from New Zealand where people stocked up on perishable food and it went off or out of date, and they complained!
We discussed several other related items but in essence, the behaviour of the authorities is due to the belief they will have enough warning time to get everyone prepared.
For the record, I disagree with this policy. I think we may NOT have very much warning depending on the circumstances of where the pandemic breaks out, what surveillance is there, and the involvement/timing of international air travel re the index cases.
At least now I have an appreciation of the thinking going on re the health authorities.
Comments?
(Editors note: I have created this as a separate comment so people can respond direct to RobT)
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