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Global Evolutionary Dynamics of Influenza Viruses

by: SusanC

Thu Apr 17, 2008 at 22:34:14 PM EDT


2 major papers were published this week that together shed some interesting light on the evolutionary dynamics of seasonal influenza viruses in humans.  
SusanC :: Global Evolutionary Dynamics of Influenza Viruses
The first paper is this one in Nature: The genomic and epidemiological dynamics of human influenza A virus Andrew Rambaut1, Oliver G. Pybus2, Martha I. Nelson3, Cecile Viboud4, Jeffery K. Taubenberger5  &  Edward C. Holmes3,4  

The authors used a data set of 1,302 A/H3N2 and A/H1N1 isolates sampled over a 12-yr period from NY State and from New Zealand, to measure the genetic diversity of influenza A virus among subtypes, genome segments and geographic locations.  Here I'll mostly address the geographic issue.

What they found was in temperate climates in both northern and southern hemispheres, there is a similar pattern, of "annual series of peaks in genetic diversity interspersed by strong genetic bottlenecks at the end of most influenza seasons."  What does this mean?  The following chart shows the degree of genetic diversity.  Notice a couple of things:

  1. There is generally more genetic diversity for H3N2 than for H1N1
  2. diversity rises into the flu season, then falls towards the end of it.  (the fancy way to describe this fall is to call it "genetic bottleneck").

The question is, if at the end of a flu season there is very little diversity, where does the next season's diversity come from?  There are 2 possibilities:

  1. local low level persistent infections and evolution during the 'off' season
  2. introduction of new strains from outside

Here's an interesting chart that gives us some clue, from the paper Influenza in Tropical Regions, Viboud et al, PLOS Med 2006.  It shows the frequency of virus isolates over different times of the year.  Notice the distinct seasonality for the US and Argentina, but for tropical countries there is year-round influenza activity.  

In the Holmes paper in Nature, the authors propose a model to explain the global dynamics of influenza evolution.  What this 'source-sink' model proposes is that each year, the seasonality in temperate climates means that most of the circulating strains die off, (or reach 'extinction'), but the following season new strains are introduced from tropical countries.  Since these countries have a much more extended flu season or year-round activity, the evolution and selection can occur uninterrupted in these populations.  

This model is more or less supported by findings from the second paper, published in Science, The Global Circulation of Seasonal Influenza A (H3N2) Viruses Colin A. Russell,1 Terry C. Jones,1,2,3 Ian G. Barr,4 Nancy J. Cox,5 Rebecca J. Garten,5 Vicky Gregory,6 Ian D. Gust,4 Alan W. Hampson,4 Alan J. Hay,6 Aeron C. Hurt,4 Jan C. de Jong,2 Anne Kelso,4 Alexander I. Klimov,5 Tsutomu Kageyama,7 Naomi Komadina,4 Alan S. Lapedes,8 Yi P. Lin,6 Ana Mosterin,1,3 Masatsugu Obuchi,7 Takato Odagiri,7 Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus,2 Guus F. Rimmelzwaan,2 Michael W. Shaw,5 Eugene Skepner,1 Klaus Stohr,9 Masato Tashiro,7 Ron A. M. Fouchier,2 Derek J. Smith1,2*

Smith has made significant contribution to the study of influenza evolution by the use of antigenic maps to illustrate in a 2D manner the antigenic evolution over time.  This is particularly useful for the selection of seasonal vaccine strains.  Here's an example of antigenic map, from the Holmes paper

Several findings from the Smith paper address the issue of local persistence vs introduction or seeding from outside.  They also used a really interesting way to show where the seeding is coming from.

  1. They compared the inter-epidemic (off season) samples to the previous local epidemic strain and to strains obtained globally.  If local persistence is the main mechanism, one should see more similarity with local previous strains, but they found this was not the case.  None of the inter-epidemic samples tested were more similar to local previous strain than external strains.

  2. In general, although there is significant diversity in local strains, the overall global pattern is much more homogeneous, showing migration of viruses over geographical regions to be more important than local persistence and evolution.  The following schematic phylogenetic trees illustrate the concept, with different colors representing viruses from different regions.  When we look at the phylogenetic tree of sequences collected all over the world (1567 HA1 sequences in total - it's one enormous tree!) if local persistence is the key mechanism, then one would expect the pattern seen in A, whereas seeding from outside would produce B.  

    Here's the observed result:


    smith

  3. The next question is, where is the seeding coming from, or where is the 'sink' from the Holmes et al 'sink-source' model?  Smith and colleagues found that globally, the evolution of the viruses are pretty homogeneous, such that they can actually chart a time-course in the antigenic changes.  Using the average global antigenic evolutionary path as the standard (or 'spline') they then mapped the deviation from this standard for each country.  

    In the following chart, the line down the center represents the global average in antigenic change.  Countries with sequences that change ahead of (ie earlier in time than) the global average gets a mark on the right.  Those that lag behind are marked to the left.  This chart in effect traces the pattern of virus seeding, from one country or region to another.  

    In general, they found that the earliest antigenic changes occur in populations in E and SE Asia, followed by N America, Europe, Oceania, then S America.  This pattern is interesting because if climate is the only determinant, then one should see other tropical or subtropical regions eg in S America being seeded early, in addition to E&SE Asia.  But that is not what we are observing - S America is clearly trailing behind.

  4. They also found that while there is circulation between different countries within Asia, re-seeding from outside rarely occurs, ie the seeding of countries outside of the E&SE Asia network of countries is more-or-less a one-way street.  The authors suggest this may be explained by the pattern of global travel.

E-SE Asia's strong travel and trade connections to Oceania, North America, and Europe (14, 37) facilitate the rapid movement of new influenza virus variants into those areas and thus explain the relatively small lag in antigenic and genetic advancement seen in those regions (Fig. 2, A and B). Also, though it is unclear how much travel there must be between two locations for them to be epidemiologically well-connected, South America's 6- to 9-month antigenic lag (Fig. 2A) may be attributable to its paucity of direct connections with E-SE Asia (fig. S5). South America's strong travel connections to Europe and North America, but not to E-SE Asia, could result in a seeding hierarchy where strains are first seeded into North America and Europe and from there to South America (Fig. 5).

If this model is an accurate representation, and antigenic changes consistently occur in E-SE Asia ahead of everywhere else, then seed strain selection for the seasonal flu vaccine may be much improved by using surveillance data from Asia.

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The question that I have
is whether this pattern and a similar amount of time lag can be expected in a pandemic?  I guess we don't know the answer to that.

As they say, more work is needed...



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


and the reason why such primary research
is important, is because we really know so little about influenza, that we are just filling in the most basic information even now, in the 21st century, like what it the pattern of global spread.

A few other interesting findings from the Holmes paper on the difference in rate of change between segments:

  1. Segments expressed on the outside of the virion has a much higher rate of change than those inside.

  2. The HA and NA both change quite markedly but independently of each other.  

  3. Certain segments appear to be linked to each other in their rate of change.  Such linkages may reflect functional and/or physical linkages for segments that need to work together, such that segments may be under positive selection to achieve 'coordination' with their counterparts and optimal function for the virus.  

    This concept is important because the requirements for optimal function may not be met by changes in one gene segment alone.  This may have implications for the formation of a pandemic virus, that different segments may have to achieve a set of changes, rather than one change, to adapt to human hosts.  The evidence for that is very sketchy, and much work still needs to be done, as usual.





All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
a couple of quotes worth contemplating
Although the increased rates of evolution in HA support models in which this protein is subject to strong selection for immune escape, the high rates of evolutionary change in other virion-associated proteins (that have different phylogenetic histories to HA) indicate that they are likewise subject to strong positive selection.

It is possible that a significant component of this adaptation involves optimizing the functional compatibility of segments; for example, a new HA variant may not increase fitness unless it is linked to functionally compatible segments.

We observed consistent dynamical patterns in two populations illustrative of temperate regions in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, together with the persistence of viral lineages across multiple epidemics. To resolve these apparently contradictory observations, we propose the existence of a continuous reservoir or source population, within which the strong selection for antigenic change takes place.

Such complexity necessarily means that the long-term success of any individual lineage of influenza virus is dependent not only on its antigenic properties but also on its replicative capacity, its transmissibility and the environmental factors that perhaps underlie the seasonality of influenza in temperate regions.





All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
more contageous
in a pandemic, I would expect the virus to be more contageous
and to arrive everywhere some earlier.
That's also what we saw in previous pandemics, except maybe 1918
where we don't quite know, where it started.
Also recently with the Fujian 2003-semi-pandemic
which arrived in USA in Nov., while usually flu-season is in Feb.

All major reassortments, which created considerable epidemics,pandemics
seem to have happened in SE-Asia (?)
Or do we have one example for a non-SE-Asean reassortment, which
survived (caused sampled descendants) for some years ?

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
answer below
All major reassortments, which created considerable epidemics,pandemics seem to have happened in SE-Asia (?)
Or do we have one example for a non-SE-Asean reassortment, which survived (caused sampled descendants) for some years ?

at least for seasonal flu, Smith et al would suggest that there is no re-seeding into SE-Asia at all, at least with the HA that they tracked within that period (caveat below).  There's no reason that it doesn't apply to the rest of the genome.  

The way they derived their conclusion is also interesting.  Given this observation of one way seeding (ie the sink-source hypothesis by Holmes et al) they put out several possible answers as to the source of seeding.

  1. Out of China.  Here the quote from the paper:
    If China alone were the source of all new variants and effectively seeded the rest of the world (16), then Chinese strains would be (i) closer to the trunk than strains from all other regions each year and (ii) consistently antigenically and genetically advanced relative to strains from other regions, both of which we do not find (Fig. 2). Commensurate with previously published studies, we find new variants are sometimes first detected in China (15, 17, 18); however, we also find that new variants are sometimes first detected in other countries in E-SE Asia (Fig. 2).

  2. Out of the tropics, as proposed originally by Holmes (remember that these 2 studies are done almost concurrently).  If that were the case, there would be 2 possibilities

    • all the tropically regions are connected epidemiologically, in which case we would see strains from all tropical countries leading, but we are seeing SE-Asia leading but not other tropical countries

    • or the regions are not connected epidemiologically, but both contribute to seeding of temperate climates, in which case we would see distinct lineages traceable to each tropical region, instead of the current global consistency in lineage.

  3. Local persistence with seeding only at transitions.  The Holmes paper suggests that is not the case.  However, Smith gives a caveat, that the period they studied did not include a major transition, so it's hard to tell if a major change might happen outside of SE-Asia and alter the patterns.

This last caveat means we cannot say for certain that pandemic strains HAVE TO come out of SE-Asia.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
nucleotides
thanks, SusanC. I should have checked fluwiki earlier on this.

http://www.flutrackers.com/for...
http://www.flutrackers.com/for...
http://www.setbb.com/fluwiki2/...

I'm not so confident in their pictures - there seems to be
some uncertainety.
I don't understand figure 4 - what's the abscissa and ordinate ?

I think whole genome analysis should be done.
Much more opportunity to detect emergence of new
polymorphisms, new variants.

Also : reassortment provides the opportunity to exactly
locate one strain, its predecessors and progenies.
A reassorted strain is a new beginning and can be tracked
better than the continuously evolving segments.

I hypothize that most reassortments happen in SE-Asia
and that could be the reason for the observed pattern ?!?

antigenic data doesn't say much about the evolution.
80% of mutations are synonymous and thus missed by antigenic analysis.

Most of the data is 2002-2006, they don't have 2007 yet, let alone 2008.
This period was disturbed by the appearance of the Fujian strain ,
especially in HA, so, the spreading pattern is even harder to see.

I haven't seen the pictures and tables, but I don't feel so
strongly about their conclusions yet.

It would be useful to have a few genomes at least each year from
South America, China, Africa, Europe.

More suitable to study the evolution seems to be the
H3N2-genome data 1993-2007 from USA which well covers each
year, except a few H1N1-years.
This data is better distributed over time and covers the whole genome,
not only HA1. OTOH it's only USA.

One idea is to examine each polymorphism, each change from
Udorn/72 separately. Where it first appeared before it
became established in a substrain. Then make a statistics
of the timing within the year.

One idea is to examine all sequence-pairs and calculate the
time of their common anchestor. If most such anchestors
of USA-sequences are dated in summer, then they probably were
seeded from the Southern Hemisphere.
I implemented it for 800 US-genomes, see the picture here:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

full H3N2-genomes from genbank, November-April isolates 1993-2007 in USA:

average distance between 2 H3N2-viruses in consecutive seasons in USA since 1993 was 179
average distance between 2 H3N2-viruses two seasons apart in USA since 1993 was 217

average accumulation of differences since 1968 was 26 per year.

why should the virus go out of the SE-Asean network, when it knows,
it won't durvive in America,Europe and needs to be newly seeded
from Asia anyway ?
Or better : why should such a virus be able to compete with viruses
which specialize on SE-Asia directly ?

Or similarly : why should an avian virus enter the one-end-road "humans",
where it will be wiped out in the next pandemic by a new virus ?

This can't be so well examined by looking at HA alone.
Viruses do reassort.

lots of questions :

what is the advantage of the SE-Asean network for flu,
why does it evolve and maintain there but not in other regions
of the world ? (if it's as suggested in the paper)
Monsun rains ? Large human population in tropical regions ?
But fly likes it cold
Is there maybe another reservoir, confined to SE-Asia,
where flu can evolve or at least survive some weeks or months
in the environment ?

Is there a similar network for birds ?
For other respiratory viruses ?
Qinghai H5N1 apparantly is maintained in the birds which breed
in the large West-Sibirian Wetlands and overwinter in the
Kaspian and Black Sea- regions.
H5N1 in Chinese birds shows extraordinary diversity with lots of reassortments not found elsewhere.
Most flu-types have been found to be maintained and coexist in
bird-populations in Northern Europe, Alberta(Canada),
Africa,China.

H5N1 in Indonesia is supposed to evolve in Indonesia alone,
not found elsewhere. Can a pandemic strain evolve and spread from
Indonesia, which is outside the SE-Asia-flu-network

Is this paper evidence that 1918 H1N1 also originated in SE-Asia ?

I assume that new flu-strains only more often(~80%?) originate
in SE-Asia but still sometimes originate in America,Africa,Europe

where to discuss these questions ?



ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


hey gs, your questions deserve a whole thesis!
Good questions.  Maybe more than one thesis.

I don't understand figure 4 - what's the abscissa and ordinate ?

Fig 4 is Fig S6 from the supplementary material.  The paper itself has another figure which is more complicated.  The caption is as follows:

Fig S6. Bootstrap analysis of evolutionarily leading and trailing regions corresponding to Fig. 2. (A) We fitted a loess spline to each of 10 datasets each composed of 5,000 strains in total, with 1,000 strains sampled at random with replacement from each of: North America, South America, Europe, E&SE Asia, and Oceania. Average distance to spline was calculated per region as in Fig. 2A (grey dots) and the mean of means for each dataset (black dots). The spline can also be interpreted as a function of time, thus time is shown as a second x-axis. Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, and Middle East were included in the analysis for Fig. 2A but they did not fall into the five data-rich regions that were bootstrap resampled for this analysis. After bootstrap resampling there were less than the 60 strain threshold for inclusion in Fig. 2A, and thus for inclusion in this figure also, for: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Canada, and Mexico.

I think whole genome analysis should be done.
Much more opportunity to detect emergence of new
polymorphisms, new variants.

Also : reassortment provides the opportunity to exactly
locate one strain, its predecessors and progenies.
A reassorted strain is a new beginning and can be tracked
better than the continuously evolving segments.

Absolutely agree.

I hypothize that most reassortments happen in SE-Asia
and that could be the reason for the observed pattern ?!?

I don't think so.  I believe the pattern of local diversity suggests a lot of local reassortment, but since in temperate climate the flu season finishes and the virus has nowhere to go, new reassortants die off, and replenishment of the gene pool depends on seeding from SE-Asia.  



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
phylo
that explanation from Fig S6. doesn't help a lot.
We have phylo-differences horizontally and vertically, no time.

In that study with the HAs they can't measure reassortments.
I think, reassortments are still rare and don't usually contribute
to seasonal diversity. Except some few dramatical exceptions.
They could easily measure this, by examining say segment 1,
segment 2, and then segments 1 and 2 together as one new super-segment.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
not correct
reassortments are still rare and don't usually contribute to seasonal diversity.

That is covered by Holmes et al.  Look at the top chart.  What's more, the different segments vary in their diversity within season.  Here's a more detailed chart.

Also in previous studies

http://pathogens.plosjournals....
/journal.ppat.0020125

http://biology.plosjournals.or...
ournal.pbio.0030300



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
diversity
they may have reduced diversity near the end of the season,
just because there is fewer flu around then ?
I have a picture with average diversity in USA per season,
it doesn't match:

http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
yes, true to a certain extent
they may have reduced diversity near the end of the season,
just because there is fewer flu around then ?

Despite the reduced diversity, the lineages still persist from season to season.  The question it where did they go, between seasons?  Or, the better question is, what is the source of next season's diversity?  The 2 papers combined give us a lot of indications that the origin of new diversity for the next season is external rather than local.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
NZ
it could still persist locally but at small levels.

You must show, that this year's USA-flu is similar to
some-months-back in Asia.
To some extend they showed this for New-Sealand + Australia
and USA in a previous study, but the dependance was not so clear,
speculating that China-USA instead of New Sealand-USA might have
been a better match.
They should really have taken China,Hongkong,Taiwan,Japan
or such instead of New Sealand in that genome-project.
Also disappointing, that Europe couldn't contribute some genomes.

Alternatively show that the calculated last common anchestor
of 2 genomes dates back to Northern summer.
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
antigenic
I think, it's silly to consider antigenic evolution at all.
We know, that evolution happens by nucleotide-changes (plus reassortment,
but that doesn't change a fixed segment) which steer the antigenics
(protein=amino-acid sequences).

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
why is it silly?
Before we know what is important and whether evolution actually happens by the mechanisms you reckon, we need to verify that the hypothesis you hold is correct.

Remember much of the hypothesis about influenza virus evolution was not previously supported by data.  It is only the recent few years with whole genome analysis (Holmes, Taubenberger, etc) and antigenic mapping (Derek Smith) that we are able to observe some trends for the first time.  So the old theories are just theories.  Doesn't mean they are wrong, but we cannot assume they are correct because a lot of that is unverified.  Till now.  And we are only just starting...



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
" And we are only just starting..."
SusanC,

 Hi. Its these little off hand remarks you make that scare me the most.

 As a layman my nieve ways let me think this whole virus thing is well known. Simple. The darn little thing is not even alive! Just a dead packet or jumble of stuff.

 Sigh, that is not the case huh? Common cold still alludes us and all. Polio and TB are only a small problem because of vaccines, not erratication.

 Thanks for the update.

Kobie


[ Parent ]
lol, that's so true
Its these little off hand remarks you make that scare me the most.

It scares me too, whenever I think about it.  The amount of things that we DON'T know.  But we have good people working on the stuff, as long as the funding can continue.  If the pandemic threat is perceived to be lowered, funding can dry up very quickly.  Influenza research was out in the cold for decades.  We are only just starting on the most basic questions.

For example, wild aquatic birds are supposed to be the natural host for flu viruses, right?  It's repeated like a mantra by everyone.  But do we know what ELSE they reside in?  We don't know the full extent of the natural habitat of flu in other species.  How do we know whether other hosts might have an important role in their evolution?  

Answer?  We don't.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
"little off hand remarks"
I agree with Kobie.

Personally, those remarks are about the only ones I even understand! LOL

My vague guess is all this understanding will have some practical implications down the line, at some point in time.

Right now, for me, it's back to trying to look at NPI on a global level.

Many don't like the "hive" word; to me, it's about being able to focus on what I can contribute to our global multitasking.

I'm glad SusanC and gs have a better understanding of this subject than I can or will get within the next few ... centuries. LOL

A usual, a big THANK YOU!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
understand
lugon, I hope my picture is clearer than the ones from the
Holmes et.al paper.
Given two viruses, you can just look how many differences
they have in their genome and then calculate the date
of the most recent common anchestor.
That is the virus, which replicated, then descendents entered two
different hosts, replicated ... ... until their descendents
are your two given viruses.

There is some uncertainety in this calculation, since
mutations are almost random, sometimes there are more
sometimes less. This TMRCA calculation is only somehow reliable
when you consider the whole genome with 13500 nucleotides,
about 30 of which change per year in human H3N2
(compared with 50 in Qinghai-H5N1).
HA1 was considered in the Smith et.al paper,
this is only 1000 nucleotides - they compensated by considering
a great number (5000) of those.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
thanks! that's helpful!
it looks like the draft for a blog entry by the reveres.

Not that I'm suggesting they work even more for us mere mortals or anything. ;-)

Seriously, gs: thanks!  I'll try and read Susan's entry again, with that piece of clarification from you.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
GS - Thank you I understand.
GS,
 I'm glad you said "there is some uncertainty in this calculation" since mutations are not liner.

 Things can mutate and then unmutate (or mutate back to teh original state)

 The British computer scientist Allen Turing did alot with state machines where changes in one or more bits, or parts, moves the state of the machine from one point to another.

  Some are linier changes, others make jumps and yes there are loops! Loops can be good or bad depending on our desired outcome.

  I saw this in a special on worm growth showing cell division. The first division split the cell in half. From that point forward all decendents took one path or the other based on the state of parent cell.

  If the parent was a skin cell then the decendent was a skinn cell not a nerve or blood cell even though the code, program, to make a blodd cell was there.

  Great stuff. But alas a virus can mutate from one point to another and back - eh?

Kobie
"Even a blind squirrel finds an acron"
All apologies to the Blind Squirrell anti defamation ministry, I hope I do not have to do public service for that joke ;o) LoL


[ Parent ]
Kobie---virii can mutate...
...but I'm wondering---once a virus mutates from it's static state into a different state, how could it mutate back into it's former state?
I would think that once a mutation takes place, the new form is complete, and any mutation back to it's original self would cause it to lose an integral part of itself, thus causing it to become inert.

No, I'm not a scientist. I just like playing with Bunsen burners...!


[ Parent ]
you're right
they don't mutate back, they just mutate into something different.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
They do not mutate back?
Bronco Bill,

 SusanC says they do not mutate back which seems odd to me.

 If a section ATGGG....CTGA is replaced by TTGAC.....CATG

Why can't the new piece (TTGAC.....CATG) be replaced by the original (ATGGG....CTGA ) ??

 These viruses keep picking up and re-assorting parts. "Parts are parts" right ;o) LoL

 I also am not a scientist but love playing with bunsen burners and Mr. Potato Heads ;o)

Kobie

[now that I am an adult they passed too many laws for me to play with the "cool" stuff my parents and grand parents could buy through the mail]

   


[ Parent ]
gs, with all respect
I hope my picture is clearer than the ones from the Holmes et.al paper.

I can't comment on your data cos I don't understand your methodology.  I don't even understand what your chart is supposed to show.  

I can't comment on the Holmes data either except I know that it is the work of some of the most eminent scientists from major institutions across 2 continents, and the paper has undergone rigorous peer review.  I don't even know how much certainty there is in their method - not that they don't have certainty, mind you, just that I personally am not able to make a judgment.  

I do, however, have grave reservations about your own certainty.  You are of course entitled to your opinion, but I just want to make that point for the benefit of the readers.  thank you.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
ahem!
Well, I know this is not an easy paper to read.  At least for me.  So I'm not saying I understand it any better now.  It's just that I have an idea (not the idea, but an idea) in layman's terms, and armed with that I might go and read the whole thing.

See, I'm not sure I can understand it, anyway. LOL

I don't even know what I'm talking about here!  It may become easy after reading it a couple of times, but time is all about selecting how to use it.  Ah, well!

Thanks anyway to you all!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
yes, its not easy to read
but the issues are critically important.  The main points are, for seasonal flu studied:

  1. reassortment is very frequent

  2. the seasonal nature in temperate regions limit the extent to which such changes can persist locally

  3. the reason why you do see persistence of lineages from season to season, and also consistency in the global picture, is due to repeated seeding from outside temperate regions

  4. by tracing the antigenic changes over time of the HA (Smith) from isolates collected from many countries, we find that there is an overall global pattern, a direction of change for the HA

  5. by comparing the changes in individual countries to the big picture changes, we can tell which countries tend to have changes earlier than others

  6. the pattern is that of emergence in SE-Asia, spreading to Europe, N America, then S America last

  7. the changes in SE-Asia lead Europe and N America by 6-9 months

  8. there is no evidence of re-seeding back into SE-Asia

  9. inside the SE-Asia network of countries, the emergence of new strains appears to be unrelated to a particular country but to continuous regional circulation (probably related both to climate and to travel)

  10. with this finding, we may be able to come up with better match for seasonal flu vaccine strains by using viruses obtained by surveillance from SE-Asia




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
...
reassortment is very frequent ?
This is relative. If you take any two H3N2-viruses from USA,
1993-2007, the probability that they reassorted in their most
recent common anchestor or that several segments have
different MRCAs is maybe 1%.

some reseeding back into Asia does probably happen. (IMO)
E.g. in 1918. Maybe 90% of clades start in Asia, is my guess.

I'm not so strong about the result of the papers. 1000 genomes and 10000
HA1s looks like a lot, but some years are missing, almost no genomes
from Europe,Africa,Asia. The data is disturbed by the Fujian-appearance,
some seasons H1N1 and H3N2 interact by host-immunity :
there are H1N1-seasons and H3N2-seasons...
In some configurations the spread-direction could still be different.

The implications for vaccine production are : wait until autumn,
if possible. Taking what just circulates in Asia in spring may not
help, because there are presumably many different strains
in the "SE-Asia network"

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[ Parent ]
"wait until autumn"
that would be good if/when there are fast and high yield vaccines!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
where did you get that?
reassortment is very frequent ?
This is relative. If you take any two H3N2-viruses from USA,
1993-2007, the probability that they reassorted in their most
recent common anchestor or that several segments have
different MRCAs is maybe 1%.

These studies tell a different story

Whole-Genome Analysis of Human Influenza A Virus Reveals Multiple Persistent Lineages and Reassortment among Recent H3N2 Viruses

Understanding the evolution of influenza A viruses in humans is important for surveillance and vaccine strain selection. We performed a phylogenetic analysis of 156 complete genomes of human H3N2 influenza A viruses collected between 1999 and 2004 from New York State, United States, and observed multiple co-circulating clades with different population frequencies. Strikingly, phylogenies inferred for individual gene segments revealed that multiple reassortment events had occurred among these clades, such that one clade of H3N2 viruses present at least since 2000 had provided the hemagglutinin gene for all those H3N2 viruses sampled after the 2002-2003 influenza season. This reassortment event was the likely progenitor of the antigenically variant influenza strains that caused the A/Fujian/411/2002-like epidemic of the 2003-2004 influenza season. However, despite sharing the same hemagglutinin, these phylogenetically distinct lineages of viruses continue to co-circulate in the same population. These data, derived from the first large-scale analysis of H3N2 viruses, convincingly demonstrate that multiple lineages can co-circulate, persist, and reassort in epidemiologically significant ways, and underscore the importance of genomic analyses for future influenza surveillance.

and this one Stochastic Processes Are Key Determinants of Short-Term Evolution in Influenza A Virus  

abstract:

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of influenza A virus is central to its surveillance and control. While immune-driven antigenic drift is a key determinant of viral evolution across epidemic seasons, the evolutionary processes shaping influenza virus diversity within seasons are less clear. Here we show with a phylogenetic analysis of 413 complete genomes of human H3N2 influenza A viruses collected between 1997 and 2005 from New York State, United States, that genetic diversity is both abundant and largely generated through the seasonal importation of multiple divergent clades of the same subtype. These clades cocirculated within New York State, allowing frequent reassortment and generating genome-wide diversity. However, relatively low levels of positive selection and genetic diversity were observed at amino acid sites considered important in antigenic drift. These results indicate that adaptive evolution occurs only sporadically in influenza A virus; rather, the stochastic processes of viral migration and clade reassortment play a vital role in shaping short-term evolutionary dynamics. Thus, predicting future patterns of influenza virus evolution for vaccine strain selection is inherently complex and requires intensive surveillance, whole-genome sequencing, and phenotypic analysis.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
predicting is complex
"Thus, predicting future patterns of influenza virus evolution for vaccine strain selection is inherently complex and requires intensive surveillance, whole-genome sequencing, and phenotypic analysis."

Could it be like predicting the weather, that's intrinsically difficult because of butterfly effects?  If that's the case, then by all means, yes, we (as a curious species) want the details, but the looked-at changes would end up being noise from which no-one can make predictions.

I wish us all the best of luck, but I really don't know how elusive predictions are, intrinsically.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
weather
yes, almost like weather prediction.

There is not so much diversity, 10 strains for the
seasonal vaccine, instead of 3 could be sufficient/reasonable.
(once vaccine becomes cheaper)

more stable parts of the virus (segment 7) are already being targeted
in vaccine experiments.
The humoral immune system, which is mainly responsible for
the virus-fight,  can't see the hidden inner segments (1,2,3,5,8).
But the cell-based immunity can, once the virus entered the cell.
So, there are also attempts for vaccines using parts of segment 5

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[ Parent ]
not so stable
look at the antigenic map.  Anyway, great discussion.  I gotta go!



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
correction
I wrote:
> If you take any two H3N2-viruses from USA,
> 1993-2007, the probability that they reassorted in their most
> recent common anchestor or that several segments have
> different MRCAs is maybe 1%.

that's not correctly formulated.

my program to build the TMRCAs-graphic,
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...
also has to be updated.

because incorrectly used 26 mutations per year,
while it's probably more like 32...

more later. Or check my forum for possible updates.
Some evidence for seeding from Asea is clear.
But how much ? Do US-viruses never survive
summer and seed back ?

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[ Parent ]
dynasty

A/NY/301/2001-01-21 has differences,days apart:

20,248:A/W-AUS/14/2001-09-26
32,352:A/NY/406/2002-01-08
51,617:A/W-AUS/35/2002-09-29
68,806:A/NY/202/2003-04-05

these are close enough to be direct progenies
from season to season.
(descendents from the original NY/301, not from each other)

Some more examples from New Zealand.
But overall this is rare.

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[ Parent ]
impressive summary - thanks SusanC
So, for seasonal flu, there's a sort of epicenter of change and looking at it closely may give better information for seasonal vaccines.

I understand it remains to be seen how that matches a pandemic situation, but at the very least it's a set of findings that help build the mechanisms of flu, so it's a bit less of a black box, maybe even a bit less random (I can dream).

(I'll keep reading your other comment.)

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
additional findings
I'm putting this separately cos they are important and separate issues.

  1. the degree of diversity of individual genes can be mapped independently,

  2. the rate of such diversity appears to differ substantially between different genes

  3. when tracked over time, major changes in the dominance of different strains and/or emergence of a new dominant strain is associated with concomitant changes (increase or decrease) in diversity of the other genes, indicating some interdependence between their functions for a strain to achieve optimal fitness

  4. as for antigenic changes, there is also much variation between the different genes, but some genes appear to change antigenically in the same direction as some others.  For example, there is some correlation between HA and M1/2 antigenic changes

  5. conversely, even though both the HA and NA change a lot, their changes do not parallel each other.  This suggests a different selection drive for the NA than simple immune escape.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
there is an additional even more intriguing story
told not just in this paper but in combination with findings from previous papers on whole genome sequencing.  Let me see if I can tell this in simple English.

First of all, viruses are assigned to different subclades by the origin of their genes.  Very broadly, H3N2 viruses belong to 3 different clades A, B, and C.  Secondly there is often a dominant strain for each season, a winner so to speak, that has successfully beaten the competition to dominate as the circulating strain.

  1. In the 2001-02 flu season and for a few years before that, the dominant strain was SY97 (from Sydney, but you don't need to know that).

  2. In the 2003-04 season, a new strain of H3N2 dominated the season (the Fujian strain - FU02) which was antigenically so different from the previous years that the vaccine was largely ineffective, and a lot of people got sick.  It effectively wiped out SY97.  The interesting story has to do with what happened the year before, in the 2002-03 season.

  3. This virus FU02 as a whole belongs to Clade A.  Most of its genes came from a Clade A virus that was not the dominant circulating virus before, but the HA of this FU02 came from a Clade B virus.  The interesting thing is this reassortment event happened in 2002 (shown by sequences over those years) BUT this new emergent virus was not able to dominate till a year later.

  4. In the meantime, the 2002-03 season was dominated by H1N1 and influenza B.  You can actually see that from the first chart I put up in the top diary.  There was a little H3N2 activity, but (here's the most fascinating part) a substantial portion of the isolates belonged to Clade B (ie the PARENT to the FU02 virus).

  5. Now this clade B virus that dominated what little H3N2 activity there was, was exactly the same antigenically as the one that came the year after that, but had different internal genes.  In addition, this clade B virus has been around for a while, but was unable to become dominant prior to the reassortant event that produced FU02.  Remember at this point FU02 was not yet dominant, but the clade B virus was, but only weakly, since the main circulating strains were H1 and flu B.

What can one infer from these observations?  

  1. Scientists have often focused on the HA to track the antigenicity of the flu viruses, but that HA story is not enough to account for which virus wins out in the selection battle.  Why?  If HA is the big scorer for selection, why should 2 viruses with exactly the same HA - the FU02 and its parent the clade B virus - have such different fates?

  2. It would appear that as the clade B virus, in competition with SY97, it was not able to win.  Fair enough.

  3. 1 year after the reassortment, when all the dust has settled, FU02 became the clear winner.

  4. in the transition period, ie 2002-03, SY97 disappeared (cos it lost out??) but what replaced it immediately was not the new FU02, but the old Clade B virus.

  5. assuming the dye was cast at that point, and SY97 was destined to be 'toast', it would appear that the newly emergent FU02 was not able to compete with the parent clade B virus initially, even though they had exactly the same HA.  Could it be that selection is based not just on HA but possibly more importantly on some factors controlled by the internal genes?

  6. since these genes (supposedly?) play negligible roles in our immune response, then the selection pressure that caused FU02 to lose out to its clade B parent in that year would have to be due to other reasons and not just immune escape.

  7. the Holmes study showed an increase of genomic diversity  (difference in TMRCA) in 2002-03, falling somewhat the following year.  

  8. another finding from antigenic mapping of all the samples shows that some genes may be coupled with another in their antigenic changes.  this may indicate a requirement for some coordination between such genes for optimal function.

  9. therefore, it may be that the FU02 virus when it first emerged, had gained the antigenic advantage conferred by a new HA, but was functionally not optimally adapted yet.  It took another year of evolution to reach that goal.

  10. the clade B virus had the same HA which should have given it advantage but was unable for all the years before, to dominate, possibly because it again did not have a set of internal genes that function optimally with the HA.  When in due course it had to compete with FU02, the second year, it lost out, showing the importance of such optimally functioning units and not just single genes.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
"optimally functioning units"
now this could be good - if such "good cop, bad cop" couples (or any kind of functional couples) do exist, and can be identified, then ... what does it mean regarding prediction?

Or maybe if some elements are more stable than others, then vaccines could target those stable elements?  It depends on whether they are targettable (surface, attackable by antibodies) in the first place.  And of course, jumping to "what to do" conclusions may be very premature, when the understanding of mechanisms is still evolving!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
I'm actually thinking of it the other way round
In the context of pandemics.  There is ample evidence that flu viruses are capable of incredible rates of change.  How many millions of reassortments, mutations, whatever, happen every day?  And yet we only have 3 pandemics in one century.

What does that tell us?  That maybe the requirements for such an optimally functioning unit to succeed as a dominant virus (ie becoming the pandemic strain) are complex and not easily achieved.  

This of course falls back onto the old arguments that if it's easy, it would have happened already.  We dismiss that argument frequently.  I dismiss it too, if someone is using it to justify complacency.  But there IS some truth to that.  My sense of urgency with regards to pandemics lies not on some certainty or even high suspicion of its imminence, but on the great catastrophe that it will mean and therefore the HUGE amount of work and very long lead time for the world to adequately prepare for it.    



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
scheme
here is a paper about the H3N2-evolution until 2005.
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.g...

I find it hard to grasp the evolution from the wording in these papers.

Can't we have a nice scheme of the most important reassortments and clades ?
(I remember these schemes from H5N1-papers)

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[ Parent ]
yeah that too
but you seem to place a lot of importance on individual changes.  These are important, yes, but I think the lessons being learned on the dynamics and also how different segments may need to work together may be even more important.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
segments cooperate
I don't see so much evidence in segments working together.
If they would, there would be no reassortments.
Well, they must somehow fit together with their tasks.

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[ Parent ]
...
I forgot, I had a list of H3N2-reassortments:

most obvious reassortment events in H3N2 :

new segments,year,virus,comment

4,1968, A/HK/1/68, H2N2 acquired avian H3-HA, causing a pandemic
1245,1969, A/HK/3/69
1345,1971, A/HK/46/71
278,1972, A/Udorn/72
146,1972, A/HK/50/72
26,1993, A/NY/758/93
17,1998, A/NY/521/98
356,1999, A/NY/332/99
38,2000, A/NY/187/00,
4,2003, A/NY/213/03, Fujian strain acquired a new HA, escaping the
vaccine and causing a severe season in USA
1,2004, A/Queensland/47/04, Fujian virus acquired PB2 from
non-Fujian H3N2 but didn't spread very much

also a large picture of H3N2-mutations 1999-2007 :
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...
U:USA,N:New Zealand,A:Australia
each row is a virus, each column a positon where mutations
occurred. Yellow lines separate the 8 segments.
Each pixel is a difference from the average nucleotide at that position.
You can easily spot the Fujian reassortment in segment 4


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[ Parent ]
link
sorry, the correct link is
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

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[ Parent ]
link
grr, wrong again. Upper case for GIF.
Why can't I edit these posts ?

this should be correct now:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

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[ Parent ]
...
the rate of diversity doesn't differ so much between the segments.
The large segments 1,2,3,5 dominate the mutation count.
HA has about twice as many mutations per unit-length in humans -
you could restrict to synonymous mutations.
M,NS,PB1 have (small) regions of overlap, which should be excluded :
no synonymous mutations there.
But just adding all mutations of the 8 segments seems to work fine.

Reassortments are sometimes more dramatical changes and are often followed by some
years of increased mutation frequency. Up to 50% more mutations or such.


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[ Parent ]
so the genetic soup
is not a well mixed one, then?

"Immune escape", after googling a bit, seems to be "loss of affinity with antibodies" or something of the sort.  So, if I read this well, there would be two mechanisms for selection of "fit to survive" elements of the quasi-species:

- One would be immune escape: if I am a slightly mutated virus, then if I can run free between the fingers of the antibody that's trying to catch me, I'll have a better chance of replicating than my slightly different brother virus who does get caught by antibody.

- The other mechanism would be ... what?  Maybe what you call "correlation with another part of the virus" that, in turn, does use the escape mechanism?  A sort of freeloading here (where another genetic segment pays for the trip and I, a gene linked by vicinity, take advantage of that), or what?

Now, if what I understand is true, then the mapping of such "important vicinities" (and please understand I'm just guessing here!) would be important, if an important change could happen by "dragging", and if we did understand what each gene does regarding lethality and so on (which, last time I read, even the best scientists weren't so sure about).

Huge baby steps, I'm guessing.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
you are guessing in the right direction, I think
what you are saying, or at least asking the question, is whether certain other genes than those that determine antigenicity (ie HA and to a lesser extent NA) can drive evolution and selection of a particular HA.  The answer is (tentatively) yes, that it would seem that optimal co-functioning with other genes is important and decides to some degree how well a particular HA will succeed.  Read the FU02 story that I wrote on a different comment.  It is EXACTLY addressing what you are saying.

But in addition to 'freeloading' or helping immune escape, I believe conceptually the issue is viral fitness.  A more or less fit virus will determine its ability to dominate in a population over other viruses that are under the same immune pressure.  eg the FU02 and its clade B parent have the same antigenic makeup, yet one is able to win overwhelmingly but not the other.

The story therefore is much more than just immune escape.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
...
lugon, now that you say it...the reveres should write about it, but I think
they are not so much interested in virology. More in medicine,pathology,
epidemiology, epidemic modeling.

SusanC, the goal is to measure from where to where flu spreads.Two approaches:
(1) TMRCA, which only needs data from USA
(2) look at individual positions from the 13500 and when+where this position first
established a change from 1972 in H3N2. This needs data from many locations.
The papers use further approaches, which I'm not so convinced about yet.

Kobie, yes viruses can mutate back. But this is not so likely with 13500 positions.
Although only roughly 3000 of these positions will mutate easily, the others are
becoming more and more unlikely.
So, after 90 years of evolution in H1N1 you get exhausted in positions and
many mutations "go back" towards 1918 just by random.
Then at some point the viruses don't move further away from 1918. We are not there
yet, but it goes slower already.
Now, our H3N2 started with a reassortment in 1972, from where it can be tracked
until today, 36 years and almost 1000 mutations later.

BroncoBill,it would only move back at one location to it's former state - still much
different. And some mutations ("synonymous" ones) are not so important for
the virus' biological properties only for its 3d-structure, its packaging or such.
Assume you want to build a stable tower with building blocks. Many methods.
Sometimes you change one placed block to increase stability in the new configuration,
which would have been a bad move in the old configuration.

SusanC, you could ask Taubenberger about my pictures.
Which one did you mean ? Take the one with the TMRCA
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...
The critical,important moments of evolution are events, when one virus creates
2 (or more) progenies which spread independantly through different hosts with
none of the 2 becoming extinct at the end of the season.
Now try to locate these moments in time and space to find the virus-"sources".
You can just find them by looking at the number of differences in two viruses
and at their location dates. This difference increases by 30 per year
as long as the 2nd virus is not yet isolated and will be a preogeny.
And by 60 else. So, with d differences, isolated y years apart the TMRCA
would be (t-y*30)/60 years.
This is a simple model and may have to be refined
considering the mentioned backward-mutations.

(reply to other posts later)


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[ Parent ]
the reveres have done their share of explaining arcane stuff
but I'm not asking them to do more!

No shoulds from me!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
Hive is for all to give and take. Lots of taking!!!!!
Lugon,

 Well put. A few make hospital plans, a work force builds the hospital but many, many more reside int it and benefit from the hospital wrought by the few.

 For all we contribute there are 6,804,747,954 need to take. Ok 6,804,747,957 ... 6,804,747,958 ... 6,804,747,961 and so on.  
Source:http://www.ibiblio.org/lunarbin/worldpop

 Its going to be scary to see the world population clock count down.

Kobie


[ Parent ]
...
I can't get my H3N2-diversity-data matched with Holmes et.al:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

I still don't understand their Fig.4

considering "antigenic" (amino-acid sequences or titers) evolution is silly,
because nucleotide-data ("genetic") is usually also awailable and gives more information,
i.e. synonymous changes. We're just studying the anchestor-progeny chains
here, not the chemical properties.
So I think the antigenic data should entirely replaced by genetic data to reduce
confusion.

I do see, that the data shows that new strains are preferrably formed in SE-Asea.
But too which extend ? Some strains or segments formed in other continents may
also survive and contribute to H3N2-evolution, although more rarely.
So it would "make sense" for the virus to leave the SE-Asean network.
Just as it might make sense for the virus to leave birds, and maybe not every virus
(or segment) which enters humans or swine eventually dies (in the next pandemic).
There are some reports of ancient outbreaks before intercontinental travel to SE-Asea
took place. And then we have influenza-B, which apparantly doesn't infect birds
and is older than human intercontinental travel

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[ Parent ]
TMRCAs - graphics improved

see here:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...
for the numbers of calculated common anchestors (called "TMRCA"s by Holmes et.al)
all seasons cumulative here:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

peaks in summer:
1992,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997,1998,1999,2004,2006
and in winter 2000/1 , 2003/4 ,
unclear are the seasons 2002/3 (two peaks,autumn and winter)
2003/4 (smaller summer-peak and larger winter-peak)
2005/6 (almost no peak)
only one sample from season 2000/1, which was a H1N1-season

So, the common anchestor of viruses appearing in USA
was typically created in a host in the summer before.
So, probably in Asia, since there is only little summer-flu in USA.
Evidence, that viruses don't oversummer without mutating, since
no virus-pairs with significantly fewer than the obligatory
26 mutations per year per genome are found.
Exceptions:
(1) virus-pairs from season 2001/2 from USA have their common
anchestor in winter 2000/1 (which was a H1N1-season).
(2) most virus-pairs from season 2003/4,USA, have their common
anchestor  

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[ Parent ]
gs I don't understand your methodology
for your charts.  I'm busy this week.  I'll have another go at reading them next week, but I believe yours may be too simplistic a model.  But thanks for sharing your work.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
the evidence does not support that
it could still persist locally but at small levels.

especially points #1 & 2 in my top diary, from Smith.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
diversity
yes, but it doesn't follow from diversity alone.

In theory diversity should increase exponentially,
until ~10% of nucleotides have mutated
but it stays almost constant at 1-2% and we have domination
and extinction. (for H3N2)

I keep updating the picture at
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...  

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[ Parent ]
it isn't diversity alone
read the points made by Smith et al, especially where the interpandemic strains are closer to the new variants than those from the previous season.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
this was shown in the Smith paper
You must show, that this year's USA-flu is similar to
some-months-back in Asia.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
it has been established that mammals infect people.
Has it been established that people infect mammals?

Could a local mammalian reservoir be the source of the "old" seasonal strains?  Why does it have to be in people?

KEEP THE GRID UP!
Prudent People Prepare Properly

"better to have it and not need it than need it and not have it!"


[ Parent ]
not really
Could a local mammalian reservoir be the source of the "old" seasonal strains?

You can tell by comparing the sequences of viruses from animals (eg pigs horses) and putting them up as phylogenetic trees.  Then given any new isolate, you can find its closest match and see where it fits.  This tells you about its origin.

Human viruses do cross into swine but it's far less common than the simple human to human seasonal tranmissions.  Swine (or other mammals) back into humans is even more rare.  These findings do not support the theory of a significant animal reservoir  as the source that contributes to the evolution of human seasonal flu.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
chart here
(a change in how this software works has made old charts unavailable sometimes)





All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
yes you are right
Most of the data is 2002-2006, they don't have 2007 yet, let alone 2008. This period was disturbed by the appearance of the Fujian strain , especially in HA, so, the spreading pattern is even harder to see.

Smith et al acknowledges that.  

The drift variants observed in this study have emerged from E-SE Asia; however, because we have not seen a major cluster transition of the magnitude of Wuhan 1995 to Sydney 1997 (~4.7 antigenic units), we can neither exclude that in such a case, a new variant could emerge outside E-SE Asia nor that it could affect seeding patterns.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
sorry, don't have time for all the questions
the last half of your comment makes a lot of assumptions, especially assuming there is an over-all geographical process of selection at the viral genome level.  The answer may be a lot more mundane than that, that there is simply not a lot of traffic from the southern hemisphere tropical regions (where you would expect year-round flu rather than seasonal) back to SE Asia



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
my thoughts on this
One idea is to examine all sequence-pairs and calculate the
time of their common anchestor. If most such anchestors
of USA-sequences are dated in summer, then they probably were
seeded from the Southern Hemisphere.
I implemented it for 800 US-genomes, see the picture here:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

full H3N2-genomes from genbank, November-April isolates 1993-2007 in USA:

average distance between 2 H3N2-viruses in consecutive seasons in USA since 1993 was 179
average distance between 2 H3N2-viruses two seasons apart in USA since 1993 was 217

average accumulation of differences since 1968 was 26 per year.

I don't know if I'm interpreting what you are saying correctly, but your approach assumes a linear process, where by tracing backwards the series of changes to their origin, you are trying to find the event that created everything else.  While it looks logical in theory, in actual practice you have ignored the very dynamic and non-linear relationship of the different gene segments with each other over time, and the effect of multiple lineages that constantly reassort.  I don't think one can use one parameter to study this complex issue.  TMRCA is just one dimension.

The antigenic part is very important even though you dismiss it.  It tells us which functional type wins out in the selection process, and in knowing that we may have a better ability to determine which changes/mutations are more significant and how.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
linear
here is a picture:
number of differences to the H3N2-1972-reassortant over time

looks pretty linear

no reassortment with non-H3N2 viruses or segments so far.
And reassortment with other H3N2 doesn't change the linearity

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panflu death expectation values
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[ Parent ]
available

the 1568 H3N2-HA1-sequences 2002-2006 from the Smith et.al. paper are available
now at genbank. I put them in one big computer-readable file here:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...
113 of these had no day of sampling, only the year, so I examined
only the 1455 remaining ones:
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

What I've done so far : spotted 9 groups which could be separated
and looked at the virus which appeared first in each group.

"Hunan", 59 viruses
739 >20-Feb-2004,5162,6,China: Hunan,HUNAN/204
...
753 >09-May-2004,5243,2,Canada,Canada/578
...
748 >28-Feb-2005,5536,1,Russia: Moscow,MOSCOW/7
---------

"Fujian", 304 viruses
683 >06-Jun-2002,4540,6,China: Hong Kong,Hong-Kong/1143
717 >17-Jul-2002,4581,5,Australia: Townsville,TOWNSVILLE/4
716 >17-Jul-2002,4581,5,Philippines,Philippines/160283
684 >18-Jul-2002,4582,5,Philippines,PHILIPPINES/471
693 >18-Jul-2002,4582,5,Philippines,PHILIPPINES/472
330 >26-Jul-2002,4590,6,China: Hong Kong,Hong-Kong/1510
718 >02-Aug-2002,4597,6,China: Hong Kong,Hong-Kong/1554
335 >11-Aug-2002,4606,6,China: Fujian,FUJIAN/411
696 >20-Aug-2002,4615,6,China: Hunan,Hunan/407
333 >09-Sep-2002,4634,6,Malaysia,MALAYSIA/145
680 >25-Sep-2002,4650,6,Taiwan,TAIWAN/8
688 >26-Oct-2002,4681,5,Guam,Guam/228
682 >31-Oct-2002,4686,6,South Korea: Kwangju,KWANGJU/219
685 >04-Nov-2002,4690,2,USA: New Jersey,New-Jersey/4
...
285 >02-Dec-2002,4718,2,USA: Alaska,Alaska/AK-RSP-02-753
...
681 >10-Dec-2002,4726,1,Netherlands,NETHERLANDS/368
...
371 >24-Dec-2002,4740,2,USA: Hawaii,Hawaii/HI-02-4055
...
715 >23-Jan-2003,4770,4,Egypt,Egypt/EG-2003900525
...
497 >08-Feb-2003,4785,5,New Zealand: Christchurch,CHRISTCHURCH/302
...
695 >03-Mar-2003,4811,6,India,India/II-031741-TS
...
367 >12-May-2003,4881,3,Chile,Chile/CI-03-6267
...(existed aleady in 2002, when examination started)
---------

"Wuhan" , 142 viruses
956 >26-Sep-1995,2094,6,China: Wuhan,WUHAN/359
881 >15-Aug-2000,3879,5,Australia: Victoria,VICTORIA/544
957 >29-Oct-2001,4319,5,Australia: Adelaide,SOUTHAustralia/102/2001
934 >01-Jan-2002,4383,2,USA: Louisiana,Louisiana/2
847 >01-Jan-2002,4383,6,China: Tianjin,Tianjin/5
...(existed already in 2002, when examination started)
---------

"HK/223" , 473 viruses
324 >24-Feb-2005,5532,6,China: Hong Kong,HONG-KONG/223
621 >11-Mar-2005,5549,6,Japan: Osaka,OSAKA/29
439 >23-Mar-2005,5561,6,China: Jiangxi,JIANGXI/198
...
685 >24-May-2005,5623,5,New Zealand: Christchurch,CHRISTCHURCH/20
...
333 >30-May-2005,5629,5,Australia: Darwin,DARWIN/1
706 >30-May-2005,5629,5,Philippines,PHILIPPINES/498
729 >30-May-2005,5629,6,Thailand,THAILAND/196
...
268 >23-Jun-2005,5652,2,USA: South Carolina,South-Carolina/SC-SC05-217-ORIGINAL
...
475 >13-Nov-2005,5795,1,France: Paris,Pennsylvania/PA-5V00335
...
631 >18-Jan-2006,5861,3,Chile,Chile/CL-6928
...
622 >05-Jul-2006,6030,4,South Africa: Johannesburg,JOHANNESBURG/503
---------

"Christchurch", 163 viruses
345 >08-Feb-2003,4785,5,New Zealand: Christchurch,CHRISTCHURCH/302
387 >09-Mar-2003,4817,5,Australia: Darwin,DARWIN/4
...
476 >27-Aug-2003,4987,2,USA: Connecticut,Connecticut/CT-767
...
416 >04-Sep-2003,4994,1,Ireland,IRELAND/9742
...
363 >08-Sep-2003,4998,5,New Caledonia,NEWCALEDONIA/14
...
442 >09-Oct-2003,5030,6,Malaysia,MALAYSIA/768
...
393 >15-Nov-2003,5066,4,Egypt,Egypt/EG-2003917221
...
479 >20-Nov-2003,5071,3,Chile,Chile/CL-4145
...
410 >23-Nov-2003,5074,1,Russia: Khabarovsk,KHABAROVSK/13
---------

"Philippines", 33 viruses
937 >21-Jul-2003,4950,5,Philippines,PHILIPPINES/621
...
932 >19-Aug-2003,4979,5,New Zealand: Dunedin,DUNEDIN/39
944 >22-Aug-2003,4982,2,USA: Washington Dc,Washington-DC/AHERN-L
...
933 >01-Oct-2003,5022,5,Guam,Guyane/GQ-RSP-03-3715
934 >13-Jan-2004,5125,6,Japan: Niigata,NIIGATA/95
943 >18-Jun-2004,5282,5,Australia: Victoria,VICTORIA/101
---------

"Japan" , 33 viruses
245 >30-Jan-2006,5873,6,Japan: Niigata,NIIGATA/342
...
249 >03-Feb-2006,5876,6,China: Hong Kong,HONG-KONG/218
---------

"Texas" , 30 viruses
329 >15-Nov-2005,5797,2,USA: Texas,Texas/TX-VC5-1434
332 >05-Dec-2005,5817,2,USA: Florida,Florida/FL-JVT-17100
336 >28-Dec-2005,5840,6,South Korea,Korea/KO-37-06
...
330 >16-Feb-2006,5889,1,Norway,NORWAY/566-1
...
339 >06-Apr-2006,5940,5,New Zealand: Otago,OTAGO/1
...
345 >13-Jun-2006,6008,5,Philippines,PHILIPPINES/1124
343 >14-Jun-2006,6009,5,New Zealand: Waikato,WAIKATO/49
348 >20-Jun-2006,6015,3,French Guiana,GUYANE/28
...
344 >15-Jul-2006,6040,5,Australia: Brisbane,BRISBANE/35
...
334 >21-Aug-2006,6077,6,Thailand,THAILAND/559
---------

"Donghu" , 29 viruses
409 >28-Jun-2006,6023,6,China: Jiangxidonghu,JIANGXIDONGHU/1435
...
410 >21-Aug-2006,6077,2,USA: Maryland,Maryland/MD-V186917
400 >20-Nov-2006,6167,6,South Korea: Incheon,INCHEON/682
420 >24-Nov-2006,6171,2,Canada,Canada/CN-RV32-07
...
395 >11-Dec-2006,6188,3,French Guiana,GYEONGGI/743

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mutations-picture
I forgot a link to the mutations-graphics :
http://magictour.free.fr/panfl...

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[ Parent ]
resistance
if new flu-viruses emerge in SE-Asia only, then migrate to other continents
and die, - as suggested by some recent papers, then we could just
stop using Tamiflu+Amantadine(+vaccine) in SE-Asia and continue in
America,Africa,Europe,Australia,West-Asia !?

We might compensate SE-Asia somehow...

Or maybe vaccinate them against the virulent strains only and thus
"cultivating" less harmful strains.
Hoping that these would kill the harmful strains by competition.

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[ Parent ]
resistance
We don't know the cause of the resistance, like was it because of human use?  Or are there other reasons, such as illicit use for animal and poultry feeds?  How do you get countries to stop doing something that they know they shouldn't be doing, and that no one is admitting?

And let's not even start about compensation.  You act as if governments have limitless coffers.  ;-D  I don't believe any government has stopping antiviral resistance as priority for spending.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
drug use
I recently read in a small remark that ECDC found resistance
in 2 different genetical backgrounds, which would indicate
resistance by drug use

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[ Parent ]
could be, but we don't know the reason
for such widespread resistance.  It needs a lot more study.  Until recently most countries were not monitoring for resistance at all, so there is very little data.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
data increase
lots of public sequences recently, almost 300 full USA-H1N1-genomes
last season. Waiting for those from 2008 now...
ECDC,CDC probably already know them.

Did they give their info to the Australians who have to
decide now, which antiviral to use ?

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[ Parent ]
I don't think they did much antiviral resistance testing
not till they started discovering the resistance in Europe and then in Asia.  It was only after that that some countries in the EU tested more samples, but I don't know about Australia, whether they have any data on resistance.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
delay
no, they already tested many samples since years. But these were
not made public. Currently in the context of the two new papers
about global evolution of influenza there are many sequences
being uploaded from previous years.
USA did upload many full H3N2 genomes from 1993 on and there was
the influenza project with many sequences from New Zealand and Australia
1999-2005.
But almost nothing from other countries. Although they clearly did
a lot of sequencing in Germany,France and other countries.
You can see in the reports, which sequences they have.
It seems to be changing now with flunet, London collects
samples from the EU now, ...
Also a big increase in uploads from USA already in the 2006/2007
season. Maybe this process was initiated by Amantadine resistance
or by H5N1.

There is still this delay. The sequences from 2006/7 were uploaded
at the end of October 2007 - too late for Australia.
Although maybe some Australian insiders secretly had
access earlier.
The reason for the delays could be the desire for exclusively
publish papers first, I'm not sure. These papers often have
a delay of ~1 year, which is also bad, when we are in time-pressure
as with H5N1.

The whole system must be improved, as Fukuda recently stated:

> In developing a WHO public health research agenda (on influenza) we are trying to push
> for a paradigm change,
> What we hope to improve is the kind of sharing and flow of information and take it to another level
> Most research is driven by individual researchers but depends on the source of funding,
> so there is also a need to sensitise donors about priorities
> It is really quite secretive until the information is published. It is like a poker game
> SARS showed we can develop a collaborative network to get people who are normally
> competitors sharing information because of a public health need
 

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[ Parent ]
I'm not talking about sequences
but about testing for antiviral resistance.  2 different things



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
H274Y
H274Y in NA is the mutation which causes Tamiflu resistance in
current H1N1. Usually detected by sequencing.

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[ Parent ]
detecting a mutation is not the test for resistance
you test for resistance, and then you try to figure out which mutation is causing the resistance.  Doing it backwards will give you incorrect results, cos the correlation between a specific mutation and resistance is not 100%, and there are probably other mutations that we don't know about that confer resistance.

Again, getting the concepts behind the approach right, is critically important, for analysis of any issues.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
this season - next season
the current situation with Tamiflu-resistance this season in Europe
seems to be closely linked to that mutation, to prevalence
of that strain containing it.
Or that strains ? We have some indication that it happened
in 2 genetical backgrounds simultaneously.
The next months should show ... when the sequences become public.

It reminds me to development of Amantatine-resistance some years ago -
that would mean we might go to levels of 90% resistance just
next season...

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[ Parent ]
2963
I have 2963  H3N2-HA1 ,  2002-2007 with exact dates
available at genbank now

continent, polymorphisms, sequences
------------------------------------
1:Asia     ,274,891
2:Europe   ,106,266
3:Africa   ,007,018
4:Ozeania  ,188,773
5:N.America,253,954
6:S.America,035,061

---------------------------------------------------------

polymorphisms = differences from A/Beijing/353/1989 (last H3N2-bottleneck)

I excluded the polymorhisms which appeared early (in 2002,2003),
because these may have first developed in another continent.

I found 67 remaining polymorphisms in HA1 from H3N2,
2002-2007 which went to another continent:

  1  2  3  4  5  6
---------------------
1 --,04,01,15,17,02    39-30
2 04,--,00,02,02,01    09-11
3 00,01,--,00,01,00    02-03
4 04,02,01,--,17,01    25-24
5 20,04,01,07,--,04    36-37
6 02,00,00,00,00,--    02-08
-------------------------
 30,11,03,24,37,08

2 main directions :

from Asia to Ozeania : 15 ( from Ozeania to Asia only 4)
from Ozeania to NA : 17 (from NA to Ozeania only 7)

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[ Parent ]
China has freed more than 9*30*3 new sequences
 segments 4,6,7 from Hong Kong
1997-2005, 30  H3N2-viruses per year.
e.g.:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/en...
paper here:
http://www.plosone.org/article...

Even more than the data presented in the
Russell et.al paper
( http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/... )
mentioned above,
these new data seem to support the thesis, that new successful H3N2 viruses,
(those which survive and travel the globe) usually emerge
near Hong Kong.
Mutations acquired elsewhere usually don't survive for long,
nor do they return to Hongkong to be included in the next year's
strains.

I haven't examined H1N1 yet, but why should it be different than H3N2 ?
Flu-B could be different, though, since it often co-exists with flu-A,
no deletion by competition. It's also only in humans.

I have been speculating that H3N2-flu persists in Chinese swine and
than jumps to humans again, so to overcome seasonality.
2 flu-seasons per year in Hong Kong.


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the second paper
is being presented by Colin Russell, like right now.  I checked, we pretty much got all the main points here.

Malik Peiris has a question, whether the pattern of transmission was the same before air travel.  Interestingly, Russell says that in the 1950s, influenza epidemics happened once every 2-3 years, not every year.

Second question was whether this had any implication for pandemic transmission.  The answer was no, unfortunately this does not have bearing on pandemic flu, and it will be quite hard to predict how it will spread.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


50s
they only had one serotype in the 50s, well plus flu-B.
Nowadays we have H3N2-seasons and H1N1-seasons, while interaction
with flu-B is small.

Maybe the non-epidemic years in the 50s (before 1957 ?)
were epidemic with
a mild virus, beating the normal H1N1 by short-term immunity


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[ Parent ]
I think what he meant
was it took a longer time for the virus to get through different countries before extensive commercial air travel.  The main revelation for me was that the pattern of annual outbreaks was NOT set in stone, but dependent on circumstances.  Which was pretty powerful, as an insight.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
just one other possible explanation

the virus is slow to enter the country in Autumn,Winter
and spread.
And then time is running out and spring comes
before the epidemic can unfold.

In USA we have 20-50 different introductions per year

if all of these fail for some reason then there would be no season.
Or just only flu-B which might be different in spreading
the continents.

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[ Parent ]
Swine flu attention turns to the tropics
good blog by Declan Butler in Nature

http://www.nature.com/news/200...

With the influenza season over in the temperate Northern Hemisphere, and just getting under way on the other side of the world, scientists are watching the A(H1N1) swine flu virus to see where it goes next and whether it will reassort with other flu viruses, or mutate, to cause more severe disease or acquire resistance to antiviral drugs.

Some researchers are warning, however, that such changes might be more likely to occur not in the northern or southern temperate zones where flu is seasonal, but in the narrow, often-overlooked belt of tropical countries where flu circulates all year round.

also

Two flu genome papers published last year, however, provide strong genetic evidence for mixing and mutation in the tropics, to yield new future strains. "All the interesting stuff happens in these tropical reservoirs, with the temperate epidemics in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres being spillovers from that," says Oliver Pybus, an evolutionary geneticist at the University of Oxford, UK, and co-author of one of the papers.

Those 2 papers are the ones discussed on this diary.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


except...
I haven't looked at this recently, but I remember that earlier
analysis showed that 2008/9 seasonal H1N1 did "survive" in USA
from season 2007/8 , same strain, and not found elsewhere

A/Memphis/03/2008/01/15(H1N1)
A/Wisconsin/17/2008/12/05(H1N1)

also the "dynasty" H3N2-virus from 2001-2003:

A/NY/301/2001-01-21 has differences,days apart:

20,248:A/W-AUS/14/2001-09-26
32,352:A/NY/406/2002-01-08
51,617:A/W-AUS/35/2002-09-29
68,806:A/NY/202/2003-04-05

maybe one company which has employees in New York and
Western Australia who travel beteen these locations ?  

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[ Parent ]
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