About
About Flu Wiki
How To Navigate
New? Start Here!
Search FW Forum
Forum Rules
Simple HTML I
Simple HTML II
Forum Shorthand
Recent Active Diaries
RSS Feed

Search




Advanced Search


Flu Wiki Forum
Welcome to the conversation Forum of Flu Wiki

This is an international website intended to remain accessible to as many people as possible. The opinions expressed here are those of the individual posters who remain solely responsible for the content of their messages.
The use of good judgement during the discussion of controversial issues would be greatly appreciated.

Breaking Out of 'N=1', the Hidden Blessing of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic

by: SusanC

Fri Apr 02, 2010 at 14:24:13 PM EDT


A series of recent studies revealed some surprising findings, that the E627K mutation (see codon table for coding) and 2 other previously described molecular 'markers' of virulence, do not in fact enhance virulence in the 2009 H1N1 virus, but the lessons underlying these findings are IMO even more important than the specific findings themselves.  Hence excuse the rambling before you get to the real data!!

Many of you know that I was an accidental blogger, my interest in flu being driven largely by the specter of a pandemic caused by the H5N1 virus.  When I first started, in late 2005, my understanding of virology in general and influenza in particular was at best rudimentary.  One of my earliest mentors, and still probably the person who has had the most profound influence on my understanding of influenza, was Dr Jeffery Taubenberger, now at the NIAID.  Jeff is of course famous for his work in reconstructing and characterizing the 1918 virus, but what I like most about his work is that he tends to ask what to me are truly paradigm-busting questions  (some interesting examples posted here, from our earliest conversations, more recent ones here, here, and here).  For my part, I try to report my evolving understanding, here on FW, as best I can.

SusanC :: Breaking Out of 'N=1', the Hidden Blessing of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
Now, when I say 'paradigm-busting', it doesn't necessarily mean that other scientists disagree or that they were/are not aware of the particular issue or question, but rather that these questions were often simply ignored, such that a set of 'conventional wisdoms' that formed the bulk of our knowledge of influenza was developed over time based, in part, on rather shaky foundations (again see examples, also Neumann 2009, below).

One of the most enduring 'paradigm-busters' that was raised in those early days of my education, was the 'n=1' problem, ie that our understanding of how influenza viruses behave in humans was based on one single virus - the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus - and its descendants, which all contained at least 5 of the 8 genes from the same origin.  As a result, it was not possible to determine to what extent observations from this single-sample could be extrapolated to future pandemic viruses with different ancestry, eg to H5N1, which has genes from entirely different origins.  

For example, scientists have found that certain mutations seem to affect virulence and/or host range (ie whether a virus can replicate in certain hosts eg humans, which by definition is a required step for a pandemic).  One particular mutation E627K in the PB2 protein attracted the most attention because it's been found that this one single change was enough to cause host-switching (Subbarao 1993).  When comparing viruses after stable host switching (which in the case of humans means indefinite h2h, whether in pandemic or seasonal flu), the pattern was very consistent - all samples isolated from humans contained K, and all samples isolated from birds contained E (Taubenberger 2005, Finkelstein 2007).  Therefore it seemed safe to conclude that E627K is a mammalian or even human adaptation, that is required for host switching, and/or that causes more efficient replication and therefore more severe disease.  Indeed there were plenty of studies that supported such a 'rule', and, over time, some scientists even began to propose a possible 'mechanism' to 'explain' such a rule, based on replication efficiency at different temperatures (Massin 2001).

The problem, of course, was that all such studies based on human-adapted viruses before the 2009 pandemic, were by definition plagued by the 'n=1' problem, such that the conclusions may be applicable to this particular lineage, but there is no data to support whether such findings can be extrapolated to other viruses.  By extension, it also means that such evidence does not allow us to make meaningful predictions based on the presence or absence of a particular mutation in virus with genes from a different ancestral origin, eg H5N1 or H9N2, and of course the 2009 H1N1, as discussed below.

Indeed, such conservative interpretation seems to be borne out by the overall experience with H5N1.  Although initially there were studies based on the 1997 virus that suggested a change from E to K increased virulence in mice, (Hatta 2001, Shinya 2007), subsequent more extensive studies on viruses from 2003 onwards did not show any consistency as to whether a E627K change increased virulence in humans, or in animals such as mice, ferrets, or non-human primates.  (Chen 2006, Govorkova 2005, Maines 2005, Salomon 2005, Peiris 2007, Li 2009)  

In addition, there's evidence to suggest that rather than single-gene mutations, viruses may need the 'right' combination of mutations (Memoli 2009) or genes (PA, PB1, PB2, and NP) that produce an optimally functioning ribonucleoprotein (RNP) unit (Salomon 2005, Watanabe 2009), in order to remain viable, switch hosts, cause disease, and/or become more virulent etc.   The 'rules' for such changes or combinations are, of course, not yet determined!

Despite these limitations and uncertainties, there is no shortage of scientists, even eminent ones, (and of course bloggers!!) who continue to present the "E627K = mammalian adaptation/increased virulence" model as if this is an established universally applicable paradigm or rule.  Just to give one example, as recently as June 2009, after the new H1N1 virus has already been sequenced and shown to contain E, a review published in the very prestigious journal Nature (Neumann 2009) described this and other supposedly known molecular determinants of viral pathogenicity (see table below) in an entirely factual manner, without caveats. (The only caveat given was that "the determinants of pathogenicity may differ among animal species.")

Out of that list, at least the first 3 of these 'rules' have now been shown to be not applicable to the 2009 virus.  The study regarding PB1-F2 is well explained in this blog 'It's not easy to make the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus a killer' so I won't comment further.  

As for the PB2 mutations, several different groups have now published their findings, in the context of the 2009 H1N1 virus.  One group studied the effect of the single mutation E627K, and found no difference in virulence or growth rates in mice (Zhu 2010).  Another group studied 3 different mutations, E627K, D701N, and E677G, and found none of them made a significant difference in replication, virulence, or transmission, in mice or ferrets!  (Herfst 2010)  By far the most interesting paper is the one from Taubenberger's lab (Jagger 2010).  Because of the study design, they arrived at some really interesting results which deserve more exploration, so I'm going to save that for the next diary (this one is already way too long, sorry!)  For now, on the question of whether E627K and/or D701N increased virulence, they found the opposite, that these mutations attenuated (ie weakened) the 2009 H1N1 virus.  

That, ladies and genlemen, is 3 strikes out of 3.  

To conclude (for now), we now know that:

  1. E627K (and D701N, PB1-F2 etc) do not enhance virulence in the 2009 H1N1 virus, in mice or ferrets  
  2. (since the virus is clearly pathogenic) the 2009 H1N1 depends on other as-yet-unidentified mutations or sets of mutations to achieve host switching, from (possibly) swine to humans
  3. we can no longer assume that results from studies of a particular lineage of virus (eg 1918 and descendants) will apply to a new pandemic virus with different origins

In other words, the 'n=1' concern has now been demonstrated to be valid, thus challenging a whole lot of 'conventional wisdoms', things that we used to think we know, about influenza.  I've heard more than a few scientists say, when talking about flu, "The more I learn, the less I know."  I can't agree more!

The upside of that is, now that we have this new virus circulating in humans, we have a second human-adapted lineage that we can study, ie we now have n=2.  2 is better than 1, obviously, not least because it allows us to re-define the boundaries of our certainties and uncertainties, but, alas, 2 is still 2.  I don't know how high n has to go, for us to accumulate enough knowledge to be able to define some vaguely 'universal' rules about influenza (especially for the purpose of making predictions!), but 2 sure is not it!!

I'll close this diary with the following quote, which appears, as a quote (doh!), in a paper authored by Jeff Taubenberger and David Morens The Pathology of Influenza Virus Infections

"We regret very much the fact that an influenza virologist is unable to live say 200 years, so that he himself would be able to see what has developed from his earlier assumptions."  J. Mulder and J.F.P. Hers: Influenza (1)

Quite!

Tags: (All Tags)
Print Friendly View Send As Email

and if this diary
leaves you somewhat depressed, about your prospects for being able to 'predict' the risk of an H5N1 pandemic, I can only say, join the club.   ;-/

But, as I said, the cup really is half full.  We now have an opportunity to test a whole lot of hypotheses.  I'm looking forward to the science being churned out as we speak!!



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


some thoughts on Neumann et al
First a couple of quotes.  First the opening paragraph (emphasis added):

The genomes of influenza viruses are plastic, owing to point mutations and reassortment events that contribute to the emergence of new variants or strains with epidemic or pandemic potential. Inasmuch, influenza A viruses have caused several pandemics during the last century, and continue to cause annual epidemics. Both epidemics and pandemics have substantial economic impact owing to the costs of prevention and treatment, work absenteeism, physician visits and excess hospitalizations. Therefore, a detailed understanding of the mechanisms that determine pathogenicity and interspecies transmission, combined with the availability of effective preventative and therapeutic measures, is critical to the control of influenza virus infections.

I would assume, therefore, that the subsequent text was meant to provide such "detailed understanding of the mechanisms that determine pathogenicity and interspecies transmission"

So, here's what it says, on E627K (again, glutamic acid = E, lysine = K)

Role of PB2 in pathogenicity and host specificity

Recently, the viral replication complex has been recognized as an important contributor to viral pathogenicity, probably by affecting viral growth. The amino acid at position 627 of the PB2 protein was first described as a host range determinant, on the basis of cell culture studies 46. The respective amino acid change was shown to determine  the pathogenicity of H5N1 influenza viruses in mice 47. Viruses with lysine at this position were pathogenic in mice, whereas those with glutamic acid were non-pathogenic in these animals 47 (Table 2). Notably, almost all human influenza viruses possess lysine at this position, whereas most avian viruses (with the exception of the 'Qinghai Lake' lineage of H5N1 viruses and their descendants) possess glutamic acid at PB2-627. Lysine at position 627 of PB2 is now recognized as a determinant of viral pathogenicity in several mammalian species.

The 2 references cited were (46) Subbarao 1993, and (47) Hatta 2001.  Both of these are briefly described in the top diary, together with many more references!

BTW The approach presented in this paper is by no means unique or exceptional.  I picked it only because it's recent, is published in a prestigious journal, and by some of the world's leading influenza experts.  There are many others who, at least in my limited observation, seem to operate from similar assumptions or worse...

Personally, I think it's important to know not just what some of the most eminent scientists of our time think, but also how they think.  Because they direct research.  Whether or not they are asking the right questions, has implications beyond their immediate laboratories, IMHO.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


learning what matters
We're still pretty much in the dark, but I think we're learning a bit about what matters most.

We'd love to have general predictions now, when all we have is candidates (H5N1, H9N2).  We'll also want more specific predictions later, once HxNy has emerged in the future, about the potential of that specific virus to change etc.

If predictions are not good enough, and I personally fear this might be the case for quite a while, then we need to look at flexibility as our main source of resilience.  Not for this diary, and just as an example, in the field of vaccines we'd need both faster vaccines and ways not to use those vaccines if they are not needed.  Likewise with school closure, etc.

Quite a bit of work to be done.

And thanks for your in-depth reviews, Susan. Looking forward to the next episode!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


the next episode
will take a while.  I'm still having major problems with my neck and shoulders.  Even though I've made progress, the recurring problem is still computer use causing RSI triggering nerve compression.  The shortest version is that I can't hold my right hand in pronation.  It's very painful (more in the mental than physical sense) and excruciatingly slow.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
predictions
If predictions are not good enough

I think in general we have to broaden our views on predictions, and not just look at molecular 'markers' as short cuts where we hoped to get simple answers.  It seems simple answers just don't exist.  So I think we need to look at broader questions, eg about the evolutionary patterns, epidemiology, host response, etc.  

In other words, lots of science to investigate.  Which is the fun part. ;-)



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Bravo

Clap Clap Clap!!!!!

 

Great post.  Thank you Susan.



Just rolling along, making waves and causing trouble...

you're welcome ;-) n/t




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Menu

Make a New Account

Username:

Password:



Forget your username or password?



Active Users
Currently 3 user(s) logged on.

Contact
  DemFromCT
  pogge
  Bronco Bill
  SusanC (emeritus)
  Melanie (In Memoriam)

  Flu Wiki (active wiki resource)
  How To Add To Flu Wiki
  Get Pandemic Ready (How To Start Prepping)
  Citizen's Guide v 2.0
  Effect Measure
  Dude's FTP

Home
Powered by: SoapBlox